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RECENT BOOKS 
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: Criminal Jurisdiction. By Joseph M. 
Snee, S.J. and Kenneth A. Pye, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1957. 
Pp. 167. $6. 
This volume can best be termed a field survey report, since it 
represents the conclusions of the authors about the current applica-
bility of national criminal laws to foreign military personnel stationed 
in host countries, based on the authors' personal ·observations in France, 
Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In another sense it is an anno-
tation of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, supple-
mented by references to experience in Japan under the Administrative 
Agreement and Security Treaty of April 28, 1952. After a brief introduction 
to the study, the authors discuss such matters as classes of persons cov-
ered by the Agreement, exclusive jurisdiction over subject matter, con-
current jurisdiction, procedural cooperation and procedural rights of 
accused persons in the nature of protection ;igainst multiple trials, proc-
ess, confrontation and counsel. 
To a casual reader one of the more immediate drawbacks of the 
book is its organization. In general it follows the pattern of a section 
heading chosen by the authors, a quotation of all or part of a section 
of Article VII and a discussion. Sometimes the section headings are lifted 
from the language of the Agreement, but at other times they represent 
an organizational concept chosen by the authors.1 Though in most in-
stances a portion of the Agreement prefaces the discussion, at least four 
sections bear no primary relationship to the text of the Agreement.2 
The content of the sections ranges rather widely. Sometimes it is a 
discussion of the implication of the language of the Agreement itself, as 
in the area of "Definition of 'Dependents.' " Usually the authors refer 
to the Working Papers of the drafters of the Agreement, to the com-
patibility of the Agreement and the laws of the host country, to parallel 
problems of federal ·law and to the attitudes of military personnel who 
administer the treaty for the respective countries. But in the case of 
waiver of the primary right of jurisdiction, 3 under Article VII, para-
graph 3(c), the discussion is solely of the Girard case,4 which, of course, 
. 1 For example, the section on "Jurisdiction of Foreign Military Courts," pp. 21-23, 
is"followed by a quotation of Art. VII, ffl(b) which refers only to "the authorities of the 
receiving State.'' "Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Receiving State and Article 134 UCMJ," 
pp. 24-33, rests on Art. VII, 1[2(b) which makes no reference to military law, but only 
to ".the law of the sending State." 
2 "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Dependents," pp. 34-40; "Exclusive Jurisdiction of 
Receiving State and Articles 2-3 UCMJ,'' pp. 41-45; "The Meaning of the Senate Resolu-
tion,'' pp. 117-119, and "The United States as a Receiving State,'' pp. 120-123. 
s Pp. 58-62. 
4 Girard v. Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
1958] RECENT BOOKS 1375 
arose under the Administrative Agreement with Japan and not under 
the NATO Agreement. 
It is also unfortunate that the authors did not carry their field 
survey to Japan, to compare the daily administration of the Japanese-
American agreement with that in Europe. All their references to J apa-
nese experience rest on federal cases or secondary authorities. Though 
Article VII of NATO SOF Agreement is reproduced in an appendix, 
the Administrative Agreement with Japan is nowhere set out for com-
parison except as quoted in the opinion of the Girard case set out in 
another appendix. For that matter, there is no discussion of the jurisdic-
tional relationship between military and civilian authorities in West 
Germany, a belated entry into NATO. Surely there must be interesting 
jurisdictional and policy questions in the case of a once hostile nation 
which later enters a treaty organization composed for the most part 
of its former adversaries. Much of the interest of the book lies in the 
description of cases not formerly reported elsewhere and in the comments 
of military administrators which disclose their interpretive position on 
the coverage of the Agreement. The volume would be much the richer 
for similar information from West Germany and Japan, since thereby 
experiences in treaty relations among former wartime allies, between 
such allies and a former enemy nation and between two individual former 
adversaries could be compared. 
These deficiencies are probably the result of an arbitrary, unfortunate 
and unworkable limitation on the scope of the work. The authors could 
have limited their attention to military regulations and case decisions in-
voking particular sections of the NATO SOF Agreement, ignoring all 
materials dealing primarily with the Japanese-American Administrative 
Agreement, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States 
Constitution and congressional legislation. They could, on the other 
hand, have written a treatise on the problems of troops stationed abroad, 
to include the historical status under international law of military forces 
present in friendly foreign nations, the inception of status of forces 
agreements, classes of persons included in such agreements, exclusive juris-
diction, concurrent jurisdiction, the character of an act as a jurisdictional 
matter, requirements of international "due process," procedural safeguards 
provided by treaty, and domestic constitutional problems raised by the 
stationing of troops abroad, to mention most of the points raised at 
least in passing in the present book. Instead, the authors have attempted 
to do a little of both and have fallen between two stools. They place 
great emphasis on tlie NATO Agreement, but refer to military law as 
they deem it appropriate, to case law arising out of the Japanese ex-
perience and to congressional activity as it tends to implement functions 
of the treaty. They specifically exclude from consideration international 
law problems based on the fact of stationing troops abroad. They dis-
cuss some procedural safeguards in the main body of the work, but 
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refer certain others to an appendix entitled "Miscellaneous Problems Under 
NATO SOF."5 In their conclusion they refer to a developing jurisprudence, 
or conjurisprudence,"6 under these treaties, to the basic desirability of 
such agreements and to the fundamental fairness of the proceedings under 
them. Such matters demand more extensive treatment than the authors 
have accorded them. This is not to say the volume is without merit. On 
the contrary, it is an extremely useful reference volume for the person in-
terested in military law, international law, or comparative criminal pro-
cedure. It embodies information not otherwise available and it gives 
useful insight into the way in which jurisdictional conflicts between the 
military authority of one country and the civil authority of another are 
being resolved. But with the_ unique fund of experience which the authors 
apparently possess in this area, it will be unfortunate if they do not 
carry on with an adequate textual treatment of the complete field. 
B. ]. George, Jr., 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
5 Appendix II, pp. 129-143, discussing burden of proof, presumption of innocence, 
nght against self-incrimination and trials in absentia. 
6 A term borrowed -by the authors from Professor Julius Stone of the University of 
Sydney. P. IO, note 19. 
